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In November of 1775 Washington’s army was settling in for a long, New England 
winter outside British-occupied Boston. Though firmly entrenched around the city, the 
Continentals lacked food, clothing, powder, and most importantly, men. Barely three 
thousand strong, Washington feared that unless Congress issued the necessary funds, the 
“lines will be so weakened” that the notoriously undisciplined Minute Men would have to 
fill in the regimental gaps. Decrying a “…dearth of public spirit, and want of virtue” that 
he saw rampant in the Congress and merchant class, Washington trembled at the 
“ultimate end of these maneuvers.” Even worse were his own men; the Connecticut 
troops were refusing to reenlist without pay, a reaction that severely undermined 
Washington’s faith in the army. “Such a dirty, mercenary spirit pervades the whole,” he 
wrote his personal secretary, Joseph Reed, “that I should not be surprised at any disaster 
that may happen.”1  
Washington’s fear of a “mercenary spirit” was certainly justified, but money was not 
the only insidious motive that jeopardized the great undertaking. Six months earlier, 
Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga and secured the canons that would liberate 
Boston; but just four years later he would become early America’s most infamous 
defector. How could one who risked life – and in Arnold’s case, limb – or liberty change 
sides? I argue that many revolutionaries were in fact mercenaries – that is, when 
independence collided with their primary motivation, be it honor, prestige, or self-
preservation – their true colors were shown. An examination of two lesser-known traitors 
– Ethan Allen and Herman Zedtwitz – as well a consideration of Native Americans and 
African slaves will show that a “mercenary spirit” drove many to both join and abandon 
the war effort, a motivation stronger than revolutionary ideology. 2 
Treachery is by nature visceral, cutting deep grooves into the collective memory of a 
society. Traitors are the antithesis of heroes, bereft of virtue, and doomed by posterity.                                                         
1 George Washington to Joseph Reed, November 25, 1775, in The Papers of George Washington 
Digital Edition, by Edward G Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 449, 
accessed December 2, 2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-02-02-0406. 
For the sake of clarity I have altered the spelling and capitalization of primary sources, but left all 
other elements untouched.  
2 For an exhaustive study on the conflict between revolutionary ideology and wartime reality, see 
Charles Royster’s A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American 
Character, 1775-1783 (Williamsburg, Virginia: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
 They are vilified in conversation, print, and in the modern world, film; Ralph Fiennes’s 
recent adaptation of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus illustrates the power that betrayers still 
command and the awe that they stir within us.3 They plague societies around the globe 
and libraries are full of books that detail their scurrilous actions. 4  But treachery is 
determined by perspective, and in revolutionary America perspective was anything but 
static. As the King’s subjects marched toward independence, opposition to the crown 
would eventually give way to wholesale treason. Allegiance was the issue – whether to a 
distant monarch or local legislature – and while Gordon Wood has argued that most 
Americans had a superficial and distant understanding of the King, betraying him was a 
most serious issue.5 Patrick Henry learned this in 1765 when he famously insinuated 
before the Virginia House of Burgesses that King George III ought to tread carefully, lest 
he suffer the fate of Caesar and Charles I.6 Cries of “traitor” reigned down upon the 
novice legislator, and while historians quibble over his witty response, the weight of his 
assertion laid bare the seriousness of the charge.7Even in Virginia, where revolutionary 
fervor would be outdone only by New England, treason was a somber business.                                                          
3 In this frequently overlooked tragedy, Shakespeare tells the story of Caius Marcius Coriolanus, 
the legendary Roman General who is exiled for assaulting the concept of popular rule. Filled with 
self-righteous indignation, Coriolanus offers his services to the rival Volscians and prepares a 
spiteful attack on Rome. But after a convincing plea from his mother, though, Coriolanus signs a 
peace treaty, for which he is eventually murdered by the Volscian military. The similarity 
between Coriolanus and Arnold cannot but overstated; the grain riots in Rome, for example, 
mirror almost exactly those that occurred in Philadelphia while Arnold was military commander. 
His archrival, Joseph Reed, could very well have been one of Shakespeare’s tribunes who stirred 
up the people and accused him of treason, much like Reed excited the Radicals of Philadelphia 
against Arnold. Though Arnold did not suffer Coriolanus’s eventual fate, he never received the 
honor or revenge he sought by switching sides, and ended his days as an odious afterthought to 
both.  
4For an example in Russian history, see my essay “Friend and Foe: The Agent Provocateur in 
Late Imperial Russia.” Madison Historical Review 9 (May 2012): 57-77, where I examine the 
mercenary nature of double agents who did far more damage to the fight against political 
subversion than good.  
5 Gordon S. Wood. The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 
1991), 16. Wood argues that a sense of Brutishness pervaded American society, including an 
ingrained hierarchical status of which the king was the head. However, he references David 
Hume’s humorous observation that colonists may have been so taken with the king precisely 
because they lived an ocean away and rarely felt his presence.  
6 Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue 
to Revolution (Williamsburg: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 94. 
7 William Wirt’s famous biography Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (1817) 
glorified this moment in history, perhaps erroneously. Relying on the third-hand accounts of 
Thomas Jefferson, John Tyler, and Paul Carrington, Wirt pieced together this speech and 
cemented Henry’s place in posterity. For a detailed argument see Joe Wolverton’s “If This Be 
Treason...” The New American 26, no. 20 (October 2010): 35-38). Edmund and Helen Morgan 
rely on, as I do, an unnamed French observer’s recollection, which corroborates some of Wirt’s 
account but omits the famous “if this be treason” line (The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to 
 To better understand the motivations of revolutionary traitors – that is, British 
subjects who claimed to be Patriots and then reversed their decision – it is essential to 
understand how revolutionaries rationalized their own betrayal of the crown. The answer 
is quite simple: they did not believe they were committing treason. Of course in a legal 
sense they fully understood the consequences of declaring independence;8 but in their 
own minds they believed that it was King who had wronged them. Armed with Lockean 
principles of contractual obligation that riddled late eighteenth century America, 
revolutionaries abolished their government with a clear conscious. 9  But beyond this 
contractual breach was the potent idea of self-preservation as “the first law of nature”, 
which not only justified separation from England but demanded it; Rhode Island claimed 
just this in their declaration of independence, arguing they were “obliged, by necessity” 
to “oppose that power which is exerted only for our destruction.”10 Instead of traitors, the 
colonists were simply good Englishmen acting as they always had – overthrowing a 
monarch when he had become tyrannical.11  
Many who betrayed the American cause would justify treason with notions of self-
preservation; nowhere is this clearer than Benedict Arnold. With nearly a century gone 
since the release of clandestine correspondences between Arnold and British spymaster 
John Andre, the prominent scholarship covers both extremes: Arnold was both a valiant 
patriot and a villainous traitor. 12 After battlefield heroics at Fort Ticonderoga and                                                                                                                                                                      
Revolution, 94). While Henry may not have uttered his dramatic quip, he certainly threatened 
King George with his allusion, drawing cries of “treason” from the crowd.  
8 Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997), 59; Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 12.  
9 Maier, American Scripture, 87. 
10 Quoted in Maier, American Scripture, 87-88. 
11 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 13. 
12Cark Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 
1941), v; There are numerous studies on Arnold’s life, military exploits, and betrayal. Van 
Doren’s landmark work sought to tell the bigger story of secret operations involving various 
operatives including Arnold, and did so convincingly by relying on the recently released Clinton 
Papers. In this account Arnold is lambasted for his selfishness and greed rather than lauded for his 
battlefield heroics. John Bakeless follows a similar route in Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes 
(New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 195) by telling various espionage tales (of which Arnold’s 
dominates), citing Arnold’s “characteristic greed for money and personal extravagance” 
(Bakeless, 282). A shift in the historiography began to occur with Willard Sterne Randall’s 
Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (William Morrow and Company: New York, 1990), which 
challenged the prevailing notion of Arnold as a traitor only. James Kirby Martin continued this 
trend with Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered (New York 
University Press: New York, 1997) by focusing almost entirely on the years before Arnold’s 
treachery. More recently, Jim Murphy has made Arnold accessible to popular readers of history 
with The Real Benedict Arnold (Clarion Books: New York, 2007), and while the title appears to 
paint Murphy as an Arnold apologist, the work is fairly neutral and incredibly helpful in clearing 
out myths passed down from spiteful revolutionaries. The prevailing notion, then, is that Arnold 
showed incredible patriotism before becoming a blackened traitor, marking him as the true Janus 
of the American Revolution. On a final side note, Canadian historian Barry Wilson has argued for 
 Saratoga, Washington appointed Arnold military commander of a politically rancorous 
Philadelphia in 1778.13 Repeatedly libeled by fellow officers and ignored by Congress for 
promotions, Arnold sought to preserve what he valued most: “I cannot draw my sword 
until my reputation, which is dearer than my life, is cleared up.”14 Writing to friend 
Horatio Gates, Arnold drove this point home by quoting a line from Otway’s verse play 
The Orphan: “But who will rest in safety that has done me wrong? / By heaven, I will 
have justice / And I’m a villain if I see not / A brave revenge for injured honor.”15  
Arnold’s friendly disposition to Philadelphia Loyalists, his marriage to Peggy 
Shippen (the upper crust daughter of a prominent New York Tory sympathizer, and the 
questionable use of military wagons for a personal business venture sealed his fate. 
Radical revolutionary Joseph Reed, President [Governor] of Pennsylvania, launched an 
all-out attack on Arnold and repeatedly censured him before the Pennsylvania Council.16 
Under this scrutiny Arnold reached his wits end, and the desperation is hard to miss in his 
pleading letters to Washington: “When I entered the service of my country my character 
was unimpeached. I have sacrificed my interest, ease, and happiness in her cause…In 
justice, therefore, to my own character, and for the satisfaction of my friends, I must 
request a court of inquiry into my conduct; yet every personal injury shall be buried in 
my zeal for the safety and happiness of my country, in whose cause I have repeatedly 
fought and bled, and am ready at all times to risk my life.”17 Perhaps the most telling 
letter Arnold penned was to Washington in May of 1779, days before he began his 
treasonous correspondence with Andre: “I want no favor; I ask only for justice…Having 
made every sacrifice of fortune and blood, and become a cripple in the service of my 
country, I little expected to meet the ungrateful returns I have received from my 
countrymen; but as Congress has stamped ingratitude as the current coin, I must take 
it.”18 But he would not bear it for long. 
As Gordon Wood has pointed out, eighteenth-century gentlemen such as Arnold did 
not share our modern conception of egotism.19 Honor and reputation were synonymous, 
both begat by fame, “the ruling passion of the noblest minds”, and fame “was what most                                                                                                                                                                      
the inclusion of Arnold’s Canadian invasion and later settlement into the nation’s historiography. 
Benedict Arnold: A Traitor in Our Midst (McGill-Queens University, 2001) stands as one of the 
few definitive Canadian studies that does not dismiss “Benedict Arnold as an insignificant figure 
in Canadian history or accept the American view that he was an unworthy blackguard” (Wilson, 
xiii).  
13 James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold: Revolutionary Hero (New York: New York University 
Press, 1997), 426. 
14 Quoted in William Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1990), 331. 
15 Quoted in Randall, Benedict Arnold, 331. 
16 Ibid., 441. 
17 Quoted in Randall, Benedict Arnold, 329. 
18 Quoted in Martin, Benedict Arnold, 428. 
19 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 207. 
 of the founding fathers were after…” 20  In this light, then, any assault on Arnold’s 
military record, his business dealings, or his marriage to a loyalist sympathizer was an 
affront to his honor. When sparring with Timothy Matlack, one of Reed’s henchmen and 
secretary of the Philadelphia council, Arnold ironically balked at the idea of the city’s 
militia refusing to turn out simply because Arnold had demeaned them: “Self-
preservation is the first principle of the human race; theirs will induce them to turn out 
and defend their property.”21 A year later, being fully disgraced with no justice in sight, 
Arnold attempted to preserve what little honor he had left and handed over West Point.  
How did once-bosom revolutionary friends interpret Arnold’s treason? John Adams, 
who had defended Arnold while serving on the Board of War, wrote Dutch nobleman 
Joan Derk that it was “proof of the weakness of the English and the decisive strength and 
confidence of the Americans.”22 Adams argued that since Arnold was unable to convince 
fellow soldiers or even “his own valet” to join in his treason, that “the American army 
and people stand strong, as strong against the arts and bribes as the arms and valor of 
their enemies.”23 Thomas Jefferson responded to the news with rage, attaching several 
newspaper clippings in a letter Horatio Gates that detailed “Arnold’s apostasy and 
villainy.”24 To Washington he reported that “the parricide Arnold” was leading a British 
attack on Virginia, targeted words that denoted a guttural hatred.25 Alexander Hamilton 
was deeply shaken, telling John Laurens that his “feelings were never put to such a 
trial.”26 Ever the womanizer, Hamilton lamented the sad plight of Arnold’s wife (who                                                         
20 Ibid. While I agree with Wood’s assessment, I argue that fame was not the primary motivation 
of the founding fathers. Rather, they sought it as fiercely as they fought for independence. Men 
like Arnold, however, when pushed to decide, chose honor over the cause of freedom.  
21 Quoted in Randall, Benedict Arnold, 438.  
22 John Adams to Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, January 21, 1781, in The Adams Papers 
Digital Edition, by C James Taylor (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda , 
2008), 65, accessed December 9,  
2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-11-02-0045 
23 Ibid.  
24 Thomas Jefferson to Horatio Gates, October 15, 1780, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
Digital Edition, ed. Barbara B Oberg and J Jefferson Looney (Charlottesville : University of 
Virginia Press, 2008), 41, accessed December 9, 2012, 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ TSJN-01-04-02-0042. 
25 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, January 10, 1781, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
Digital Edition, ed. Barbara B Oberg and J Jefferson Looney (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2008), 335, accessed December 9, 2012, 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ TSJN-01-04-02-0408. In Latin, “parricide” denotes 
the murder of one’s close relative, a term that umbrellas patricide (murdering one’s father), 
matricide (murdering one’s mother), fratricide (murdering one’s brother), and even matricide or 
uxoricide (murdering one’s husband or wife). This word choice reveals that Jefferson still saw 
Arnold as a countrymen, making his attack on the tidewater settlements even more base.  
26Alexander Hamilton, The official and other papers of the late Major-General Alexander 
Hamilton:compiled chiefly from the originals in the possession of Mrs. Hamilton, comp. Francis 
L Hawks (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1842), 460, accessed November 2, 
2012, http://find.galegroup.com.ezp1.villanova.edu/mome/ infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=
 was as yet unsuspected) to friend Catharine Schuyler: “Could I forgive Arnold for 
sacrificing his honor, reputation, and duty, I could not forgive him for acting a part that 
must have forfeited the esteem of so fine a woman.”27 Nathanael Greene aptly summed 
up what most colonists would soon feel: “Never since the fall of Lucifer has a fall 
equaled his.”28  
Fame, which Arnold coveted so badly, had turned to infamy. On October 3rd, 1780 his 
effigy was paraded down the streets of Philadelphia beside Satan, bringing Green’s 
allusion to fruition.29 The next day Congress had his name erased from the official rolls 
and the Connecticut Masonic Lodge where Arnold belonged followed suit.30 The graves 
of his father and brother were defaced, and many called for a national holiday lest 
posterity forget Arnold’s disgraceful legacy.31His troubles continued in British uniform, 
and as late as 1787 he was still attempting to defend his treachery as a matter of principle 
rather than money.32 Interpreting Arnold’s claims of gratitude as honor and compensation 
as livelihood, his “mercenary spirit” was laid bare. Independence was not Arnold’s 
primary goal; rather, he sought advancement, recognition, and when those failed, 
monetary compensation.  
Ironically, one of Benedict Arnold’s early nemeses has survived the Revolution 
generally unscathed. Charismatic and hot-tempered, Ethan Allen appears to embody all 
that was good and right with an independent America;33 yet, as Willard Randall points 
out, much of what we know about Allen is the result of folklore.34 Few Americans know 
the historical Allen, who, despite his bravery at Fort Ticonderoga and prisoner-of-war 
suffering, was a “self-interested individual as well, often no less rapacious than his 
archenemies, the New York Land barons of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys”.35 More 
pointedly, many remain blissfully unaware of his double-dealings with British agents to                                                                                                                                                                      
MOME&userGroupName=vill_main&tabID=T001&docId=U106139966&type= 
multipage&contentSet=MOMEArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
27 Ibid., 480. 
28 Quoted in Jim Murphy, The Real Benedict Arnold (New York: Clarion Books, 2007), 221. 
29 See Figure 1, Burning Benedict Arnold in effigy, 1780, Stephen A. Schwarzman Building / 
Print Collection, Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, New York , 
New York Public Library Digital Collection, accessed December 12, 2012, 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1223571.  
30 Murphy, The Real Benedict Arnold, 222. 
31 Ibid. 
32Randall, Benedict Arnold, 605.  
33 William Sterne Randall, Ethan Allen: His Life and Times (New York: W.W.  
Norton and Company, 2011), xii; Charles A Jellison, Ethan Allen: Frontier Rebel (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1969), 245-46. For example, Allen once disobeyed a Connecticut 
statute that forbade smallpox inoculation because he believed the law was ridiculous. After 
vaccinating himself, he got drunk at the local tavern, dared anyone to insult him, and did a fair 
amount of blaspheming; later in life would again take the law in his own hands when he felt 
personally threatened.  
34 Randall, Ethan Allen, xxi. 
35 Ibid., xiii. 
 secure Vermont lands and entry into the Union – his true objective of the Revolution. 
Therefore, Allen’s actions, which like Arnold’s were quite heroic, also betray a 
mercenary impetus.  
Embroiled in the vicious, pre-revolutionary politics of property disputes, Allen was 
no stranger to bribery. By 1770 New York land barons were seeking to expand their 
holdings into Vermont and pressed the courts to evict New England pioneers.36 Rising to 
defend the Green Mountain settlers was Allen, but in the face of corrupt Supreme Court 
justices, he was soundly defeated. 37 In the aftermath of the ruling, King’s counselor 
James Duane offered Allen land, cash, and even a horse if he would persuade his 
constituents to abide by the ruling.38 Allen accepted the cash and horse, though he used 
these items return to Vermont and organize a military resistance in the event that an 
eviction might occur.39 
Thus, in 1778 when a Loyalist spy promised Allen a generalship should he sway 
Vermont toward the crown, he keenly realized the potential.40 Although Allen reported 
the bribe to the Continental Congress, he also urged Vermont Governor Chittenden to 
keep quiet about the letter and consider how they might exploit the offer.41 This began a 
three-year “dangerous game, going back and forth between the British and the 
Continental Congress, letting each know only part of his dialogue with the other, all the 
time keeping Vermont on its independent court.” 42  By 1781, Congress had still not 
accepted Vermont’s bid for statehood, leading Allen to write his British contact General 
Frederick Haldimand, “I shall do every thing in my Power to render this State a British 
province.”43 From Amsterdam John Adams conveyed this exact worry. “That Vermont 
will plague us a little,” he wrote friend James Searle. “I expect to hear that there are one 
or two there, Arnoldized.”Although Adams hoped that men like Allen wouldn’t fall for 
the “tricks and pranks” of the British who made “a great many promises that they 
[Vermont residents] shall enjoy their lands”, he feared that such ploys would “end in the 
flight of these Devils a ‘Arnoldoise.’”44  
Writing a few years after the war, Allen admitted that if England had offered 
immediate protection for Vermont he “would readily have yielded up their independency 
                                                        
36Ibid., 222. 
37 Ibid.,223.  
38 Ibid., 235-236; Jellison, Ethan Allen, 37-38. 
39 Randall, Ethan Allen, 239. 
40 Jellison, Ethan Allen, 245-46.  
41 Randall, Ethan Allen, 480-81; Jellison, Ethan Allen, 247.  
42 Randall, Ethan Allen, 491. 
43 Quoted in Randall, Ethan Allen, 493. 
44 John Adams to James Searle, February 8, 1781, in The Adams Papers Digital Edition, ed. C. 
James Taylor (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 128, accessed November 11, 
2012,  
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-11-02-0085.  
 and become a province of Britain.”45 While the seriousness of Allen’s double-dealings 
can be debated, it is clear that the preservation of his people, state, and personal lands 
was the driving force that compelled both his bravery and treacherous flirtations.46Had 
Washington not exerted pressure on Governor Chittenden to accept the proposed 
boundaries of Vermont, one can speculate that the tiny republic would have stayed 
independent or, as Adams feared, returned to British control. King George was not 
Allen’s primary enemy; this title was reserved for those who threatened his holdings in 
Vermont, be they English or American. Therefore, Allen was driven by a motivation 
stronger than patriotism, marking him a mercenary first, and a hero second, if at all.  
As Charles Royster has soundly argued (and as these case studies have shown), there 
existed an obvious cleavage between revolutionary ideology and wartime conduct. 
“Americans saw many discrepancies between the two, and these induced deep concern 
and prolonged tension; for, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, war put to the trial the 
military ardor and skills as well as the moral assumption which they based their hopes for 
American independence and liberty.”47 In the early years of the Revolution John Adams 
witnessed this contradiction and it vexed him greatly. “Virtue and simplicity of manners, 
are indispensably necessary in a republic,” he wrote friend and author Mercy Warren, 
“but there is so much rascality, so much venality and corruption, so much avarice and 
ambition, such a rage for profit and commerce among all ranks and degrees of men even 
in America, that I sometimes doubt whether there is public virtue enough to support a 
republic.” 48  While troublesome among the populace, Jefferson found this mercenary 
nature especially dangerous in the military where soldiers were supposed to be “breathing 
the pure spirit of patriotism” and remain “untainted by pride or rank, or avarice of pay.”49 
But rather than take “their post wherever placed” and change “whenever required”, the 
officers of the Continental Army jockeyed continually for promotion and often feigned 
resignation to assuage their honor. In 1776, for example, General Sullivan tendered his 
resignation when General Gates was made head of the Northern Army instead of him. 
Although he eventually withdrew his papers and went on to have a somewhat successful 
military career, Sullivan’s actions belay a deceptive aim that would drive many to 
treason. 
Prussian immigrant Herman Zedtwitz desired such prestige, and while his mercenary 
dealings have not warranted a monstrous biography, his treachery was nonetheless rooted                                                         
45 Quoted in Jellison, Ethan Allen, 248. 
46 For a full discussion on the competing arguments and sources see Jellison, Ethan Allen, 247-48.  
47 Royster, A Revolutionary People At War, 3.  
48 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, January 8, 1776, in The Adams Papers Digital Edition, ed. 
C James Taylor (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 398, accessed November 
18, 2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-03-02-0202.  
49 Thomas Jefferson to Congress, July 29, 1776, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital 
Edition, ed. Barbara B Oberg and J Jefferson Looney (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2008), 478, accessed December 9, 2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ TSJN-
01-01-02-0197.  
 in Adams’s “avarice and ambition”.50 A Prussian cavalry officer during the Seven Years 
War, Zedtwitz moved his wife and children to New York City in 1770 where he tried his 
hand at several business ventures, most of them poorly. At the outbreak of war, Zedtwitz 
volunteered to raise his own regiment of Pennsylvania Germans, but was instead given 
the lesser rank of major in New York’s Continental regiment. Doubtlessly disappointed, 
he nevertheless joined General Montgomery’s expedition to Canada and was wounded 
after he “fell down a rock” which left him “so disabled by a rupture…that he [was now] 
unfit for active duty.”51  
Physically lame (and therefore humiliated), Herman Zedtwitz could no longer pursue 
personal glory. Thus, he resolved to chase “avarice” in treasonous form: a debt owed to 
him by a British officer. According to Zedtwitz, the Marquis of Granby had asked him to 
raise a company of riflemen during Britain’s dispute with Spain over the Balkans seven 
years prior; but the noblemen died, leaving Zedtwitz to foot the bill for the entire 
regiment.52 Now, unable to acquire further military standing due to his injury, he became 
obsessed with recollecting this debt and formulated a treacherous plan: give the British 
fabricated intelligence in exchange for the two thousand pounds that Granby owed him.53 
With fame out of reach, Zedtwitz was willing to commit treason by hounding the enemy 
for money – another objective he put above independence.  
Zedtwitz’s letter to royal New York Governor William Tyron, which was quickly 
intercepted, reads like a mercenary manifesto. Claiming to be a “forced man of a 
rebellious mob” who joined the Americans out of fear that he would become 
“ruined…with my wife and children”, Zedtwitz swore his loyalty to the King – forgetting 
of course that he volunteered in the Continental Army. 54  His claims were equally 
outlandish: he had an informant who could supply the British with weekly updates on the 
American forces; he had overheard Washington talking about poisoning the New York 
water supply to rid the city of the British; and most ostentatious, he was about to be given                                                         
50 Zedtwitz’s career has been briefly surveyed by Lorenzo Sabine in Biographical Sketches of 
Loyalists of the American Revolution, with an Historical Essay (Baltimore: Genealogical Pub., 
1979), 456-66, and more recently by Harry Thayer Mahoney and Marjorie Locke Mahoney in 
Gallantry in Action: A Biographic Dictionary of Espionage in the American Revolutionary War: 
XA-GB (Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Univ. Press of America, 1999), 334-35. Carl Van Doren discusses 
Zedtwitz in Secret History of the American Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1941), 15-17, 
stressing the confusion of his treachery though avoiding his elongated imprisonment and mental 
illness. The most recent and in-depth analysis is Eugune R. Fingerhut’s "From Revolutionary To 
Traitor: The American Career of Herman Zedtwitz," in The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, 
Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle Colonies, ed. Joseph S Tiedemann, Eugene R 
Fingerhut, and Robert W Venables (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009) which 
pieces the story together using court documents, letters, as well as Sabine’s work. I have relied 
primarily on Fingerhut and Van Doren.  
51 Quoted in Fingerhut, “From Revolutionary To Traitor, 182; Van Doren, Secret History, 15.  
52 Ibid,. 180. 
53 Ibid., 184-185.  
54 Quoted in Fingerhut, “From Revolutionary To Traitor”, 184; Van Doren, Secret History, 16.  
 the command of several Hudson forts.55 In his court martial Zedtwitz argued that these 
were simple manufactures designed to reclaim the money owed him; but what is 
interesting is that he ostensibly had no regard for his honor at this point. The opening 
lines of his letter to Tyron state, “By giving you this intelligence the world will ardently 
blame my character”, a statement that shows Zedtwitz was ready to commit pretend 
treason – that is to say, trade whatever honor he had left using fabricated information – 
for money.56  
Eugene Fingerhut has succinctly compared Zedtwitz and Arnold’s near-identical 
journey from hero to villain, but it is their shared motivation that unearths the mercenary 
within: “Both men thought and (more importantly) felt they were trivially rewarded for 
their efforts,” Fingerhut observes, “considering that they were permanently injured and 
forced to retire from field duty.” 57 When military glory was unattainable, each man 
turned to profit as a means to secure honor, bypassing the primary goal of independence 
that propelled true patriots. The absence of “avarice and ambition” that Adams’s utopian 
republic required was not to be found in either man, nor did they breath “the pure spirit of 
patriotism” that Jefferson lectured Continental officers for lacking. Rather, they pursued 
selfish ambition in varying forms to gain something other than victory over the British. 
Zedtwitz’s military career understandably caused the revolutionaries great worry, for 
what would become of a country where men fought for money and fame? “I do not wish 
to have the army wages raised,” General Sullivan wrote Adams in 1777, as merchants 
were gouging colonial troops for basic supplies, “but I wish to strike at the root of the 
evil...or I fear we are undone.” Soldiers were deserting because the meager pay could not 
provide for “their poor families”, yet founding fathers like Sullivan were concerned that 
offering more money would fill the ranks with mercenaries like Zedtwitz. Throughout the 
conflict revolutionaries balanced these two evils with much angst, and while they 
lamented the vice that was “so prevalent in the country” they hoped that virtue would rule 
the day instead of the destructive “mercenary spirit.”58  
To recast traitors as mercenaries naturally widens to scope of culpability; indeed, 
there were two other groups who had a stake in the fight for independence, participants 
that changed sides at a whim to secure personal objectives. Native Americans and 
African slaves did not always share the white aims of the Revolution or the political 
inclusion, but that did not prevent them from aiding the cause; in many cases, it did just                                                         
55 Fingerhut, "From Revolutionary To Traitor” 184; Van Doren, Secret History, 16.  
56Quoted in Fingerhut, "From Revolutionary To Traitor” 184. As mentioned above, I have 
corrected the spelling and capitalization for all primary sources for reasons of clarity. However, 
Zedtwitz’s original writing is so rife with grammatical errors and some syntax issues, the original 
my look quite different.  
57 Ibid,. 191. 
58 John Sullivan to John Adams, November 13, 1777, in The Adams Papers Digital Edition, ed. 
C. James Taylor (Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, 2008), 327, accessed December 
12, 2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-05-02-0193.  
 the opposite. The Mahican peoples of Stockbridge, Massachusetts, for example, fought 
bravely for Washington (and received minimal recognition or compensation), though 
most natives would side with the British. 59  Likewise, both slave and free blacks 
volunteered for the colonials after Washington encouraged the measure and Congress 
begrudgingly acquiesced, but an overwhelming number of slaves fled to British lines for 
freedom and served in a military capacity.60 This dichotomy illustrates the varied beliefs 
about who could offer Indians and slaves a better future, or perhaps more importantly, a 
better present. 
 As Native American historian Colin Calloway has made clear, neutrality during the 
Revolution was a veritable pipedream for Indian peoples;61 few felt this more than the 
Abenaki, whose Odanak community would support the British and Americans at different 
points in the war. On the surface their alliances seem unclear, but underneath the 
“confusion and ambivalence, all Abenakis at all times shared the goal of preserving their 
community and keeping the war at arm’s length.” 62  Because of their proximity to 
Canada, the Odanak community understood that they would have to live with whoever 
won the war; much like Ethan Allen, then, they undertook a “’play-off system’ between 
two powers” to secure the best possible future.63 Some Abenaki agreed to scout for the 
Americans, though often they ignored this duty along with other, pro-British Abenaki 
who were scouting for the Crown.64 Considering their circumstance, this strategy was 
“ideal…for people who wanted to give the appearance of commitment but whose main 
concern was to keep the war away from their homes and families.”65  
One can hardly blame Indian peoples like the Abenaki for changing their allegiance 
with the prevailing winds. Most tribes who sought neutrality during the war suffered 
dearly; the Maquachake Shawnee, for example, repeatedly lobbied their fellow Ohioan 
brethren to pursue peace with the Americans but had their villages burned nonetheless.66 
Likewise, the Moravian Delawares allowed themselves to be removed by the British to                                                         
59 Collin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in 
Native American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 94. For 
Washington’s opinions on their service, see 100. 
60 Sylvia R Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 63, 77-78. 
61 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 65. For an example of the Iroquois 
Confederacy see Robert W Venables, "Faithful Allies of the King: The Crown's Haudensaunee 
Allies in the Revolutionary Struggle for New York," in The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, 
Royalist, and the Revolution in the Middle Colonies, 1763-1787, ed. Joseph S Tiedemann, Eugene 
R Fingerhut, and Robert W Venables (Albany: State University of New York, 2009), 137-139. 
62 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 65.  
63 Ibid., 82. 
64 Ibid., 81. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 158. For a similar experience following the war, see David Andrew Nichols, Red 
Gentlemen and White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American 
Frontier (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008).  
 only be slaughtered by the settler militias; their capital town of Coshocton was summarily 
razed by American troops in 1781 despite their attempts to “accommodate conflicting 
tensions and keep out of the war”. 67  Self-preservation as a motivation for double-
dealings, then, was a fervent among Indian peoples, yet it appears that most Americans 
did not consider this to be traitorous. Rather, both British and American governments saw 
the natives as advantageous allies and sought to cultivate their allegiance no matter how 
insecure. Perhaps they did not see the Indians as political members of their society, or 
possibly the precedent of shifting wartime alliances was so engendered in the colonial 
mindset that it did not quality as treason.68 Whatever the case, the actions of many Native 
peoples during the war exposes the fundamental principle of self-preservation that drove 
other patriots to treason.  
African slaves during the Revolutionary War shared both the liquid fidelity and 
political exclusion of Native Americans. As Michael Groth has illustrated, slaves in New 
York’s Mid-Hudson Valley adopted a similar ‘“wait and see attitude” hoping to maintain 
a cautious neutrality as long as possible.69 Striving for personal freedom, they “made 
decisions and pursued courses of action that best served their personal interests or 
improved their own positions.”70 For some, such as a slave named Jack from Duchess 
County, this meant joining up with a Loyalist gang led by Teunis Peer and taking part in 
ongoing sabotage campaigns against former owners. For Jack’s friend of the same name, 
personal interest was best served by feigning allegiance to Peer’s gang before informing 
his master of the Loyalist’s plans.71 Much like Native Americans, African slaves were 
driven by competing circumstances rather than conflicting revolutionary ideals.   
Like Indian peoples, geography was often the greatest determinant of allegiance for 
slaves. As British armies invaded the south slaves flocked to their lines, even more so 
after the Dunmore and Philipsburg Proclamations offered freedom to those who deserted 
                                                        
67 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 180. 
68 For political interaction between Natives and state/federal emissaries after the war see David 
Andrew Nichols’s Red Gentlemen and White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for 
Order on the American Frontier (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008). I agree 
with Nicholas that the new American government frequently engaged in the political through 
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Valley," in The Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalist, and the Revolution in the Middle 
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(Albany: State University of New York, 2009), 93.  
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 rebel owners or Continental units.72 The effect was profound, for by war’s end over sixty 
thousand slaves had fled plantations in Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia alone.73 
Once in royal service, slaves usually served as military laborers, carried supplies, or 
cleared roads for British regulars, though a few black units did see action.74 During the 
Franco-American siege of Savannah, for example, a few hundred former slaves bravely 
defended the city and were even heralded by Governor Wright.75 But a love for King 
George’s monarchial rights over his subjects was not the motivation for these runaways; 
their goal was “personal freedom…the most powerful inducement to flee one’s owner.”76 
Likewise, many slaves enlisted in Continental units and fought bravely for the 
American cause, but did so with competing motives.77 In the summer of 1778 Stephen 
Haight allowed his twenty-eight-year-old slave Caesar to join a company in Colonel 
Cortlandt’s American regiment, but a year later was unable to locate his bondsmen. 
Apparently Caesar had been discharged at Valley Forge for health concerns, and rather 
than return to his master, chose personal freedom. Having no plans to return to bondage, 
Caesar’s actions demonstrate that “allegiance could be fickle” and that “those who 
actively supported one side at one point in the conflict did not hesitate to shift or even 
betray allegiances when necessary.” 78  
The great irony, of course, is that slaves had more at stake than any other Americans 
during the war. Forcibly brought to a foreign land they endured real enslavement, not the 
political kind that Jefferson bemoaned in his early drafts of the Declaration – language 
that was eventually omitted precisely because it made southern delegates (and a few 
northern ones) so uneasy. George Washington experienced this paradox in 1781 when                                                         
72 In 1775 Governor Lord Dunmore of Virginia issued a proclamation offering freedom to any 
slave who fled a rebel owner and joined the British army. In 1779 General Henry Clinton would 
issue a similar decree from his headquarters in Philipsburg, New York that applied to all slaves: 
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77 Alan Gilbert has recently argued in Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in 
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previously been acknowledged. While I concur, my focus is African slaves who I argue saw their 
role in the war as a means to an end even more than their free brethren who likewise served the 
cause of freedom. Gilbert also explores the provocative idea that many southern patriots fought to 
secure the institution of slavery rather than independence, a claim that would mark them as the 
mercenaries I have studied herein; further scholarship on this particular element is certainly 
warranted and hopefully forthcoming.  
78 Groth, "Black Loyalists and African American Allegiance," 94. Groth’s interpretation of 
Caesar’s flight is that he was seeking freedom, and I concur. However, it is important to note that 
other motives could have propelled him to flee, such as finding a loved one. 
 twenty of his slaves flocked to the HMS Savage as it landed across the Potomac from Mt. 
Vernon. The Marquis de Lafayette, fighting in Virginia at the time, relayed the events to 
Washington in blunt terms: “When the enemy came to your house many negroes deserted 
to them.”79 Lund Washington, the General’s cousin and estate manager, prophesied this 
sentiment six years earlier on the eve of Revolution when slave escape was already 
brewing: “…there is not a man of them, but would leave us, if they believed they could 
make their escape…liberty is sweet.”80 That the chattel of General Washington flocked to 
the enemy is not surprising, then, and sheds light on what the conflict meant to many 
enslaved Africans.81  
My purpose has been to show that treachery during the American Revolution was 
mercenary in nature – that is to say, that traitors were actually mercenaries feigning 
allegiance, false patriots in the fight for independence. Benedict Arnold, Ethan Allen, and 
Herman Zedwtiz may have fought and even sacrificed to overthrow Great Britain, but 
that was not their primary objective. Instead they sought honor, money, and esteem – 
venal aims that only emerged when threatened. Native Americans, who were brought into 
the conflict against their will, naturally shared this mercenary strain and tried to stave off 
disaster by shifting their allegiance frequently. Similarly, slaves saw the war as a vehicle 
to freedom and joined whichever side could assure them liberty. I intended to highlight 
the competing motives of these latter two groups in hopes of bettering understanding 
their wartime experience rather to pass judgment on the paths that they chose. Moreover, 
I contend that contemporary observers did not consider these groups traitorous precisely 
because they existed outside the body politic. That Indians and slaves were in fact 
political members of the society is clear; failing to report roaming enemy troops or 
fleeing a plantation to join rival forces is without question a political act. In the 
contemporary sense, however, these two groups were not accepted as such and therefore 
not castigated for shifting their allegiances to suit personal circumstance. Rather, both 
British and American leadership often coaxed Natives and slaves whom they viewed as 
beneficial allies. 
Ultimately, “avarice and ambition” would not bring about the ruin that so many 
revolutionaries predicted. While their fears were not unsupported, the founders                                                         
79 The Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, 23 April 1781," Lafayette in the Age of the 
American Revolution: Selected Letters and Papers, 1776-1790, Vol. 4, ed. Stanley J. Idzerda 
(Ithaca, New York, and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 60-1. 
80 Lund Washington to George Washington, December 3, 1775, in The Papers of George 
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accessed November 27, 2012,  
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81 This episode is cogently explored in the Digital Encyclopedia provided by the Mount Vernon 
Ladies Association, a trust that sponsors the preservation and restoration of the estate. For a full 
discussion including the sources, see Digital Encyclopedia , s.v. "HMS Savage," accessed 
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 underestimated the constitution of their people at large. Disastrous losses at New York, 
cold winters at Valley Forge, and occupied cities became the crucible for the Americans, 
boiling off the ranks that enlisted for venial aims. Though a few mercenaries remained, 
they would eventually be exposed as traitors when their true intentions failed, outlasted 
by Washington’s army of “men fighting for everything worth living for.”82  
 
 
  
                                                        
82 George Washington to James Bawdoin, August 14, 1776, in The Papers of George Washington 
Digital Edition, ed. Edward G Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 19, 
accessed December 12, 2012, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-06-02-0014.  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1, Burning Arnold in effigy, 1780, Stephen A. Schwarzman Building / Print 
Collection, Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, New 
York , New York Public Library Digital Collection. 
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